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Haptic Spectatorship and the Political Life of Cruelty, or, 
Antonin Artaud “Signaling Through the Flames”
R. D. Crano
The separation of culture and life in interbellum France
The first words of Antonin Artaud’s The Theater and its Double, first published 
in France in 1938, read as follows:
Never before, when it is life itself that is in question, has there 
been so much talk of civilization and culture. And there is a 
curious parallel between this generalized collapse of life at the 
root of our present demoralization and our concern for a culture 
which has never been coincident with life, which in fact has been 
devised to tyrannize over life.1
It seems peculiar that Artaud, the twentieth century’s quintessential thinker of 
cruelty, would open his one book on theatre theory with a fundamentally “moral” 
concern. Culture, as it stands, and its concomitant construct of “civilization” 
“tyrannize” by operating externally to the lives that they affect. “Life itself,” in all 
its profundity, remains both unknown and unsought as those who happen to be living 
it are allowed only approximate cultural representations (and misrepresentations) 
of what it could be. In response, Artaud desires a restoration of life by way of a 
physiologically affective theatre, a Theatre of Cruelty, as he names it, wherein 
spectatorial experience would become an essential exercise in liberation from the 
“tyrannical” culture of the interbellum French bourgeoisie—its art, politics, social 
codes, modes of production, and so on, all of which remain formally, spatially, and 
temporally cordoned off from any firsthand experience of the fullness of life. Taking 
as its primary task the subversion of bourgeois culture’s removal from life, Artaud’s 
theatre refuses its artistic inheritance while striving for the unthinkable: a perfect 
“coincidence” with—and ontological indistinguishability from—something called 
“life.” The one doubles the other, but as neither representation nor simulacrum, 
neither mirror nor shroud; rather, this staged doubling must make it seem as though 
it is in fact life that doubles the theatre (as the book’s title overtly suggests) and, as 
such, becomes empowered and allowed to emerge amongst the stale confabulations 
of “civilized” culture’s more intellective or psychological pursuits. What the theatre 
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can and should do is expose our domesticated faculties of perception to strange and 
provocative sensations. Such exposure is a fundamentally political activity, insofar 
as true politics always entails forcing something previously unperceived into a 
given perceptual field.2 Along these lines, Artaud’s invocation of “tyranny” needs 
to be carefully weighed. Against the political operation that inscribes a necessary 
distance between ruler and ruled, we might extract from Artaud’s critique a more 
immediate, undisciplined autonomy, a politics “coincident” with everyday life.3 In 
terms of stagecraft, this means challenging, on a number of fronts, the dominant 
text-bound mode of theatrical production by suffusing the spectatorial body in 
an undifferentiated multisensory milieu of non-representative, counter-mimetic 
impressions. 
I argue for the primacy in Artaud’s thought of this problem of reconciling 
culture and life. There seems to be a general tendency in Artaud scholarship to 
overlook the “moral” concerns that frame his text. Many regularly discussed 
threads in his oeuvre might be productively resituated in light of his historically 
specific anxieties over the increasing distance between “life” and its various public 
avatars—between what is supposedly interior and what is shared. An indispensable 
moral problem, I believe, conditions Artaud’s many theatrical and theoretical 
creations. Cruelty, plague, alchemy, madness, and the like are but partial solutions, 
or rather different takes on the same foundational concern to reverse the trend of 
“present demoralization.”4 Though perhaps too often concealed by his contemptuous 
rhetoric, on the one hand, and poetic abstractions, on the other, Artaud’s polyvalent 
“doublings,” in the final analysis, offer us an ethic of rigorous humility and a politics 
of direct, unmediated action. In order to recover and critically reassess these lines 
of thought that he himself either failed or refused to make explicit, this essay takes 
as its point of departure those spectatorial forms of life that the Theater of Cruelty 
alternately destabilizes and extends.
“Talk of civilization and culture” obscures what is really at stake—namely, 
the “present” moment—as “never before.” Such a claim to historical uniqueness 
demands a sociopolitical contextualization that many of Artaud’s readers too often 
reduce to conjectures about his reaction to the bourgeoning totalitarian spectacles 
of interwar Europe. This investigation, however, necessitates a more nuanced 
approach. Recognition of the particularly tumultuous political culture of France in 
the 1930s affords a better sense of how, for Artaud, an increasingly tenuous political 
climate could smother life’s barely flickering flame. The French Third Republic 
(1870-1940) was plagued by a seemingly unending string of scandals and crises, 
and a large part of Artaud’s writing emerged from the era’s most tumultuous years. 
From May 1932 to January 1934 alone, five governing coalitions came to power 
and promptly collapsed. The endlessly banal ministerial reorganizations that ensued 
spread anti-parlimentarian sentiments that had previously been the province of a 
small minority on the far right. Influenced by the meteoric rise of fascism in Italy 
Spring 2010                                                                                                            51
during the preceding decades, the right had galvanized around a shared penchant 
for militaristic displays of strength and an exploitative fascination with parades.5 
Artaud must have been disturbed, firstly, by what many historians have dubbed 
the “decadence” of French political culture during the Third Republic.6 But the 
manipulative spectacles generated by the predominantly monarchistic right were 
perhaps even greater cause for consternation, especially given their potential 
and clear intent to usurp the singular powers of the theatre. All told, it is less an 
impotent political culture than an impotent cultural concept of the political—one 
that circumscribes little more than petty affairs and reactionary resurgences—which 
motivates Artaud’s impassioned calls to re-moralize the present, as it were, and 
reactivate life. 
Although Artaud, unlike, say, Bertolt Brecht, refuses to adopt an explicit 
political platform for his theatre, his intent to restructure his spectator’s constitutive 
relationship to space, time, and the world on the whole has a distinctly political 
import. In the theatre, the spectator doubles her role as a political, economic, and 
historical being. Within the space-time of a cultural sphere “coincident” with that 
of life, the political, economic, and historical subjectivity of one who so doubles 
herself is exposed as not just socially constructed and therefore mutable but also 
powerfully, profoundly inhospitable to “life.” We can thus extract from Artaud 
a recognition that cultural dimensions are, in the modern age, the primary site 
for the production of (potentially counter-hegemonic) subjectivities.The theatre 
becomes the metaphorical factory floor on which individuals are constructed, 
exploited, and—with the evolution of cruelty—granted the potential to resist the 
normative, passive comportments to which they had been confined. Where self 
indulgence and righteousness rule in the political sphere, and where bourgeois 
culture only reinscribes, in one way or the other, this deprivation of life, Artaud 
posits an agitative theatre that communes with its audience via an unmediated 
presence incommensurate with concurrent figurations of subjectivity, linguistic 
representation, and functionally compartmentalized space and time. I will, 
first, reexamine Artaud’s dramatic theory in light of his acute and curiously 
underappreciated investment in the potential (or perhaps virtual) “coincidence” of 
culture and life, and, second, explicate the moral, ethical, and political ramifications 
thereof. In turn, a rearticulation of his thoughts on presence, language, spectatorship, 
and the pragmatic concerns of the metteur-en-scène will help formulate a more 
precise sense of what is meant when readers, following his lead, invoke the concept 
of “life.” 
The moralization of time
“Present demoralization,” in one sense, means nothing less than a 
demoralization of presence—the failure to appreciate the imminent possibilities for 
a coincidence of culture and life irreducible to the electoral politics of the center-
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left establishment or the spectacularized politics of the anti-parliamentarian right. 
The traditional Occidental theatre, according to Artaud’s reading, encourages the 
passive consumption of “artistic” pleasures with little or no existential expenditure; 
little or no “risk” on the part of the egocentric viewing subject; and thus little or 
no engagement with the political, economic, and technological forces radically 
changing life outside the theatre space. In the age of the industrial-technological 
reproducibility of art,7 the task of putting culture and life into coincidence must 
take one of two tacks: either it renders life closer to industrial reproducibility, 
making each singular form of life more or less indistinct, or it attempts to rescue 
culture for life by sabotaging the machinery of mass reproduction. It should, over 
the course of this article, become clear that the Theatre of Cruelty adopts the first 
of these methods of coincidence. Just as past masterpieces are best left to the past,8 
so too with past forms of life. Artaud’s heated rejection of bourgeois notions of 
identity and selfhood, along with his obsession with his own becoming-machine, 
evinces a certain desire, on his part, to explore the latent potential of the new, often 
jarring reproduction technologies of the early twentieth century. Practically, this 
desire motivated a number of experiments that sought to introduce outside life, 
most frequently in the form of audio recordings, into the affective space of the 
theatre.9 The intended result was presumably the production of a liminal space-
time wherein “real” life could be continuously recycled, replayed, and called into 
question. And this threshold between culture and life, where the one regularly 
undergoes a topological deformation into the other, hinges as much on temporal 
reconfigurations as on spatial deconstructions. In the “present demoralization” 
of 1930s France, time itself, or a particular way of experiencing time, is at stake. 
Perversely, the interplay of live and recorded sounds—a feat made possible by 
dehumanizing industrial technologies—offers a presence fit to be called “moral,” 
one that reverberates rather richly through time, a present resonant with the past 
that it has always already become.
Framing a cultural problem in terms of “life,” Artaud identifies the ontological 
stakes of theatrical production, which ultimately fold into the processes of 
individuation by which the social body constitutes itself. Artaud’s critique of 
“civilized culture,” his revaluation of presence, and his implicit theorization of 
a “moral” resurgence all revolve around his sustained attack on the passively 
perceptive, disembodied spectator. In her study of the “imperceptibility of 
life” in Artaud’s writing, Dorothea Olkowski advances a Bergsonian model 
that distinguishes two levels of spectatorial activity: selective perception and 
sensory-motor affection. Where the former affirms the intentional efficacy of the 
viewing ego, the latter—in its most heterogeneous state, free from all perceptive 
interests—“constitute[s] a world in motion, a world that vibrates with [the] multiple 
rhythms [of other beings].”10 For Olkowski, Artaud undercuts the sedimented 
habits of selective perception by forcing the spectator to continuously confront this 
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vibratory world that constitutes perception but cannot itself ever be fully actualized 
or consciously considered in its totality. David Graver similarly charts Artaud’s 
insistent disruption of spectatorial subjectivity, which he argues is achieved, in 
practice, through a reconfiguration of the geometrical boundaries of the theatre 
space. Surrounding its audience on all sides with a diffuse mise en scène, the Theatre 
of Cruelty strips its spectators of “the implicit authority of their all-encompassing 
gaze” and “does violence to [their] expectations for the innocuous pleasures of 
aesthetic consumption.”11 
I would add to Graver’s reading a supplemental, though perhaps anterior, 
interruption that Artaud incites on a temporal plane. Because we are dealing 
with vibrations, we must necessarily turn our thoughts toward time. As the 
“demoralizing” gap between culture and life widens, so too does that between self 
and other; the “tyrannical” circumscription and reified isolation of the spectatorial 
subject—individuated herein as a passive onlooker of both theatrical culture and 
political life—grows increasingly severe. From an ethical perspective, the theatre 
affords an experience of durations that are wholly other. Be they of gestures or 
screams, illuminations or overdetermined things, these other durations throw 
spectators back into their own duration with a resoundingly new sense of the 
fragility of their time.
Many of Artaud’s ideas on art, life, and spectatorship would find resonance 
in the decades to come. Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle, for example, 
opens by similarly decrying how “everything that was directly lived has receded 
into a representation.”12 And more recently, Bernard Stiegler, perhaps the most 
astute, politically-oriented contemporary interpreter of the increasingly influential 
mid-century philosopher Gilbert Simondon, has argued that the technical-social 
milieu of the current “hyperindustrial” epoch threatens to absorb human lives 
into processes of individuation that are collective but not at all co-produced.13 
This in mind, Artaud’s most ardent concerns seem to portend the autocratic 
course that individuation and subjectivation would take as the century advanced. 
His experiments with the simultaneously destructive and creative forces of pre-
individual affects manifest a persistent effort to undermine what I call, following 
Debord and Stiegler, the necropolitics of everyday life. Along these lines I seek to 
recover an ethical dimension to Artaud’s project, insofar as ethics takes as its most 
basic operation a critical engagement with how individuals—triangulating as they 
do culture and life—“coincide.”
Where Artaud calls for his spectacle participants to “dissolve into universality.”14 
Gilles Deleuze (himself inspired by Artaud) discovers in Simondon a strikingly 
similar sentiment. The individual, according to Deleuze, is arrived at through a 
process of creative differentiation, a conversion of intensive affects into extensive 
signs. “Indi-differentiation,” as he calls it, always carries with it a pre-individual 
component, a “reservoir of singularities,” the identification of which makes possible 
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a retroactive critical movement of de-differentiation that shares much with Artaud’s 
pining for “universality.”15 Yet this universal dissolution of the spectatorial body 
means much more than a new mode of experiencing theatre; part of a larger 
struggle to actualize an intersubjective world and a genuinely co-productive model 
of transindividuation, it implies a complete reworking of political and cultural 
infrastructure outside of the time and space of the theatre.16 Geoffrey Baker asserts 
that Artaud’s is “a transformative tragic politics that seeks to overcome unpalatable 
social regimes by interrogating the epistemological formations and structures of 
representation from which they spring.”17 There is thus a crucial link between 
language and culture, on the one hand, and sundry state and non-state governing 
apparatuses, on the other. Only through a transformation of culture—that primary 
site for the co-productions of subjectivity and resistance18—might the almost 
comically unstable politics of interwar France be redeemed. 
Occupying the gaps between self and other, culture and life, the threatening 
promise of the Theater of Cruelty entails constructing an affective presence where 
there had been only an alienating void, a presence that reverberates through time 
and is consonant with the whole of the past into which it invariably recedes and 
the future that interminably overrides its immediacy. The theatre, by imbuing the 
space of culture with a pulsating sense of life, presents what could not hitherto 
have been presented—namely, that void instantiated in the medium’s so-called 
bourgeois mode. In affirming the theatre’s unique potential for immanent, gesturo-
haptic affection prior to verbal representation, Artaud desires a theatre no longer 
dormant, no longer pacifying, reawakened to its ability and increasingly pressing 
need “to break through language in order to touch life.”19 He theorizes faculties of 
visual and aural perception pushed to their respective limits, forced to a threshold of 
exteroceptive indistinction, each sense passing into the other. At their limit points, 
the separate faculties must confront at once those gestures previously subordinated 
to texts, as well as the hapticity—that primeval touch—at the heart of each ocular 
and aural sign.20 “The soul,” Artaud asserts, “can be physiologically reduced to a 
skein of vibrations.”21 His theatre, in turn, reconfigures its audience as an assemblage 
of such “physiologically reduced” souls who no longer perceive the theatre but 
become alchemically affected by it, corporeally overwhelmed by a field of visual 
and aural intensities from which linguistic representation must struggle to emerge. 
The spectatorial “soul” here collapses into a vibratory “skein,” a tangled composite 
of no-longer-distinguishable sensations.22 “There is no transition from a gesture 
to a cry or a sound: all the senses interpenetrate.”23 Visual and aural perceptions 
become con-fused as pure vibration, in a primordial chaos of sensation that can be 
captured neither by reflective thought nor the written word.
In a sense, Artaud bridges historical time, as the theatre he conceives transports 
participants to an epoch of humanity prior to the cultural devaluation of gesture 
and the hegemony of alphabetic writing (which the bourgeois theatre proudly 
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inherits). This bridge is manifest most clearly in his will to access or reconstruct a 
preindividuated spectatorial milieu, and it evinces a theme that recurs throughout 
The Theater and Its Double—specifically, the need to create links, occupy gaps, 
and open thresholds—which explains why separation, in its many modes,24 remains 
the object of antagonism through much of this work. Between life and its cultural 
representation, an irremediable distance prevents direct access to the former while 
shoring up a widespread, superficial appreciation for the latter. Theatre-as-art is of 
only passing concern, as it is life itself that Artaud seeks to radicalize. And this life 
emerges, remarkably, precisely in the void between presence and representation—
that crucial zone of space-time in which acculturated individuals and political 
subjects are continuously produced. In wiping away the transmitting medium with 
a signified thing, representation necessarily stifles one’s affective relationship to 
one’s near past. With the goal of restoring this relationship, Artaud’s theatre works 
almost exclusively on the spectatorial body (on both individual and collective 
corporeal planes), utilizing the dormant somatic capacities of the form to finally 
exhaust the dramaturgical art of linguistic signification. By occupying the gaps, 
as it were—between signifier and referent, self and other, culture and life—the 
Theatre of Cruelty becomes a vehicle for the fundamental transformation of both 
individual and collective bodies. Theatrical revolution and the revitalization of life 
are thus, for Artaud, ontologically indistinguishable acts; each doubles the other 
in hopes of overcoming the stale complacency of modernity’s spectator-citizen.
Perspective, empire, and the birth of spectacular society
In 1950s and 1960s Paris, the Situationists were transposing (without 
acknowledgment, of course) Artaud’s position into an expressly socially and 
politically theorized field of action. Debord’s aforementioned book, the group’s 
seminal treatise, opens its dual critique of consumer capitalism and totalitarian 
politics with a distressing account of the “separation perfected” therein.25 Founded 
on multilateral social disintegration, the spectacle can only be overcome with a line 
of “active direct communication”26 very much like what Artaud had argued for the 
generation prior. In terms of the aesthetic agenda, cultural commodities would be 
replaced by “constructed situations,” whereby processes of art and life intertwine 
to interrupt the state of things and open up new fields of sensory experience. In 
this sense, Situationist street theatre, urban derives, and agit-prop campaigns 
seem genuinely to realize his desire to breathe new meaning into the used-up 
signifier “life.” A semi-scripted performative act in an otherwise non-theatrical 
space, their constructed situations exploit and draw energy from the conditions 
of boredom necessary to the reproduction of spectacle and concomitant modes of 
subjectivation. Distinctions between performers and spectators collapse; all simply 
become “livers,” whose libidinal investment in spectacular representation becomes 
détourned in advancing “experimental forms of the game of revolution,”27 which 
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is of course nothing less than the “game” of life.
It should be no surprise that Debord pinpoints 1927 as the birth of spectacular 
society, coinciding precisely with Artaud’s most formative production experiences.28 
Though he refuses to provide empirical details of any sort, it may have something 
to do with European colonialism’s need—having largely exhausted its extensive 
reach29—to adopt an intensive function, which would be rather well served by 
rapidly evolving technologies of image production.30 Turning inward, the imperial 
impulse revealed itself in the 1930s most significantly in forms of intra-continental 
conquest and (what Debord would later call) the “colonization of everyday life.” 
Artaud’s undertaking, in turn, is to reverse these “demoralizing” geopolitical and 
socioeconomic trends plaguing modern European life.
“When we speak the word ‘life,’” Artaud says, 
it must be understood that we are not referring to life as we 
know it from its surface of fact, but to that fragile, fluctuating 
center which forms never reach. And if there is still one hellish, 
truly accursed thing in our time, it is our artistic dallying with 
forms, instead of being like victims burnt at the stake, signaling 
through the flames.31 
Foregoing any critical engagement with the subjects “formed” by political, 
economic, social, and cultural institutions, the bourgeois theatre of the 1930s 
operates in hiding, behind its text, its artistic formalities, its didactic values, and 
so on.32 It irrevocably alienates its viewing audience by positioning its enactments 
as distant, absent, and other than life. The live convergence of bodies and affects, 
which in fact constitutes all theatre, seems not to register within traditional modes of 
production. Subsequently, life here loses its “fragility”—its phantasmic presence—
and becomes a mere “surface fact” set in a dormant dialectical tension with art, 
which functions only to depreciate both terms of the equation. 
Artaud turns the imitative theatre of the bourgeoisie on its head, seeking to 
expose as derivative and wholly insufficient its mediated treatment of life, which 
perpetually lags behind the real life “touched” by a new theatre that takes as its 
ultimate project a sort of out-spectacularization of the spectacle of the state: “In 
the anguished, catastrophic period we live in, we feel an urgent need for a theatre 
which events do not exceed, whose resonance is deep within us, dominating the 
instability of the times.”33 From the militaristic parade culture of the French far 
right and the scandal-ridden bureaucratic mainstream to the personality cults of 
Nazism and Stalinism and the increasingly visualized market capitalisms of England 
and the United States,34 Artaud finds himself suffocating in a generalized politics 
of appearance completely overrun by the hegemony of industrialized image-
production. In the final analysis, the agglomeration of diverse spectacular regimes 
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in interwar Europe made consumers of the masses and put “life” at a severe distance 
from its everyday incarnations. In return, Artaud offers a theatrical spectacle that 
more-than-appears—a counter-spectacle, if you will—that activates all the senses 
and forces a proprioceptive awakening of its newly potentiated audience. Where 
“formal dallying” preserves the culturally constructed bourgeois subject and satisfies 
one’s intellective fancies, the Theatre of Cruelty, in repudiating such artifice, seeks 
a direct, unmediated relationship with the spectatorial body, what Derrida (in an 
essay on Artaud) names an “existence without signification.”35
Where the speech elements of the traditional theatre fail to achieve true aural 
affect on account of their fidelity to a read (which is to say static, spatialized) 
text, Artaud’s own timbral and rhythmic deformations of language render him 
the aforementioned victim at the stake. Indeed, far from signifying, his “signals” 
seek to touch “that fragile, fluctuating center” which, however “reached,” cannot 
be made to comport with a “knowledge” adept only in “surface facts.” The “life” 
that Artaud, the writer, “speaks,” remains wholly averse to recognition—its forms 
always unsettled and evolving, its essence always there but impossible to identify 
or represent. Like Deleuze’s concept of the virtual, “life” might be thought of 
as “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.”36 Whatever formal 
actualizations emerge from Artaud’s take on the concept of life must remain just 
that: whatevers, inessential byproducts of his pragmatic working through of the 
most vital problem of them all—“demoralizing” separation.
Gesture and/in language
In “Metaphysics and the Mise en Scène,” Artaud most precisely defines the 
parameters of language in his theatre:
To make metaphysics out of a spoken language is to make the 
language express what it does not ordinarily express: to make 
use of it in a new, exceptional, and unaccustomed fashion; to 
reveal its possibilities for producing physical shock; to divide 
and distribute actively in space; to deal with intonations in an 
absolutely concrete manner, restoring their power to shatter as 
well as to manifest something; […] to consider language as the 
form of Incantation.37
   
In keeping with my politicized reading of sensation, “concrete” language—as 
incantation—makes things appear that should not appear, that in fact cannot 
appear under normal conditions. “To make metaphysics out of a spoken language” 
is to refuse the alphabeticization and grammatization (which again is to say the 
spatialization) of speech, to affirm the temporality of verbal presentation. The 
Theatre of Cruelty takes up linguistic deformation as the basis for the cultural 
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and social change it seeks. In so doing, it preserves and recharges that which is 
obliterated by the written word and script-bound theatrical production—namely, the 
temporal continuity and gestural capacity of the human voice.38 Artaud thus draws 
our attention to the fact that the meaning of an expression is perpetually bound up 
in stylistics, in how it is said, in its rhythm and timbre, in the way its words have 
been illicitly lifted from past usage, and in its situational contingency—in the 
possibility that it could always have been semantically the same but vibrationally, 
affectively otherwise. 
In linguistic terms, the arch concerns of demoralization and separation coalesce 
in the widely discussed gap between signifier and referent. Baker in fact argues 
that “Artaud explicitly ascribes the problem of the times to the space between 
signifier and referent.”39 Having done with “closed, egoistic, personal art,” Artaud 
intends to rupture the language of representation in which the bourgeois subject 
has remained comfortably couched. The theatre’s dependence on sedimented 
forms shares much responsibility for the “present demoralization” of culture 
and life. Rather than “touch” the audience at an immanent, pre-intellective level, 
script-bound productions relate a writer to an audience through the intermediary 
characters that, to some degree, speak primarily for her or him. On the contrary, 
in the Theatre of Cruelty, normative signifying processes need to be suspended so 
that words and gestures might begin to take on the non-referential attributes of, for 
example, lighting or sound. All elements of the mise en scène boil down to “a skein 
of vibrations”40 that affects the spectator sub-sensically (which is to say psychically, 
collectively, and pre-individually) and so preempts the validation of her identity as 
a centrally positioned and internally coherent viewing subject.
Seeking the reunification of body and language, he asserts, “What the theater 
can still take over from speech are its possibilities for extension beyond words, for 
dissociative and vibratory action upon the sensibility.”41 The outcome, I believe, 
is something like a radical humility in the face of semantic ambiguity. From the 
vibratory intercorporeality of the cruel theatre we can derive a new and antagonistic 
subjectivity produced when signs become “dissociated” from their signifieds, which 
had determined them to represent transcendentally rather than “really mean.” 
In the community to come, the political community that the Theatre of Cruelty 
precipitates, humility and care respond not to what is said but to how such sayings 
occur, not to words per se but to “signals through the flames.” Demanding a de facto 
reconsideration of who can be included and excluded from political life, sensation, 
rather than representation, must determine the nature and scope of social change.42 
By attending more to the pre-linguistic, non-representational attributes of the mise 
en scène than to its formal and verbal production of meaning, Artaud distinguishes 
his theatre—on political grounds—firstly from that which seeks only to imitate and, 
in so doing, distance itself from life, but also from certain avant-gardist trends that 
similarly forego multisensory impact in favor of a strictly intellective engagement 
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with its audience. 
Drawing on Artaud among others, Julia Kristeva describes the two-fold 
functioning of language: on one hand is the symbolic, which grants referential 
meaning to the phonetic components; on the other hand is le semiotique, comprised 
of non-signifying movements—rhythm, timbre, intonation, and so on. Where 
the symbolic is spatial and referential, the semiotic is temporal and musical.43 
Attempting to “break through language,” the work of a “questionable subject-in-
process” such as Artaud serves as “a release for the anger of its time” and marks 
“the place where the social code is destroyed and renewed.”44 We can thus assign 
to the Theatre of Cruelty a cathartic and restorative task: first, to affirm and take 
responsibility for the production of subjectivity and, then, to construct alternative 
modes of psychic and collective individuation more attuned to the “fragility” of 
life and the “rude and epileptic rhythm of [the] time[s].”45
Taking inspiration from the canonized masterpieces, the traditional theatre 
fails even to recognize its potential to affectively dislocate the spectator at the 
pre-linguistic level that Kristeva so brilliantly theorizes. Likewise for the mere 
“dallying” of the formal avant garde, which achieves a fair amount of critical and 
popular success between the wars. That said, one of the more notable distinctions 
between the “demoralized” bourgeois and “dallying” avant-garde theatres, on the 
one hand, and Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty, on the other, lies in their respective 
conceptions and treatments of audience. The former address reified subjects; the 
latter assembles a spectatorial body inseparable from the immanent vibratory 
affects of the theatrical experience, then distributes that body along the coordinates 
of a revolutionary topology that continuously deforms culture into life, and vice 
versa. The cruel performance must repeatedly disrupt spectatorial perception and 
interpretive agency. And herein lies an unexpected movement towards humility, 
to which neither scholars nor practitioners have given much notice. On the 
flipside of Artaud’s rejection of bourgeois culture lies the tacit affirmation of a 
moral code to come, one that perhaps can never be fully constituted but must 
nevertheless be struggled over perpetually. Any politics or culture that posits the 
individual as its primary operative unit would seem arrogant according to Artaud’s 
schema, which, against “closed” art, values open, impersonal explorations of the 
collective unconscious. By rigorously delimiting the scope of human knowledge, 
by humbling—and even humiliating—the most prized faculties of enlightened 
modernity (i.e., thought and vision), by presenting an always incomplete moral 
code, the Theatre of Cruelty demands an unprecedented commitment of its 
spectators, upon whose affective capacities and intercorporeal permeability the 
whole production turns. 
In reversing the trend of “depreciating everything,” Artaud’s theatre presents 
the “terrible and necessary cruelty which things can exercise against us.” 
“Depreciation,” it would seem, is the ironic result of excessive appreciation, 
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whereby aesthetic discourse and thought gets reduced to idle talk, parlor chatter, 
blandly indiscriminate remarks. Responding to this trend, Artaud uses a variety of 
tactics to deform the word-things that comprise his language. Screamed words, for 
example, do much more than signify; like “signal[s] through the flames,” they are 
more felt than heard. In “cruel” fashion, sonic things become tactile, pushing hearing 
into a zone of hapticity. “We are not free,” he soberly admits, “and the sky can still 
fall on our heads. The theatre has been created to teach us that first of all.”46 And: 
“My mind, exhausted by discursive reason, wants to be caught up in the wheels of 
a new, an absolute gravitation.”47 Here gravity takes on strange new meaning as an 
indiscriminate force that unites all beings in their equal and unequivocal subjugation 
to its unrelenting constraint. In an odd twist, this experience should ultimately 
engender humility. (We are being “taught” after all, by this Chicken Little theatre.) 
Above all else then, Artaud’s is a rigorous interrogation, first, of what Martin Jay 
has analyzed as the Cartesian perspectival scopic regime,48 and consequently of the 
Eurocentrism and colonial geopolitics that rose in its wake and were coming to a 
head in the multivalent industrializations of culture, party politics, and everyday 
life in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Yet we must be cautious in our endorsement of Artaud’s project. It hardly needs 
to be pointed out that the most salient arbiters of “new, absolute gravitation” of 
1930s Europe were the Nazi and Stalinist regimes. (Following Debord, we might 
also include the increasingly automated production and consumption patterns of 
capitalism’s more “diffuse” spectacles.) Is Artaud simply succumbing to their 
surging popularity, or more specifically, that of the intensely dogmatic French far 
right? How, we must ask, does the political and ethical takeaway of his project 
remain distinct from these bourgeoning forces of the interwar milieu? What is it 
about his all-encompassing spectacles that prevents their being reduced to mere 
replications of the blind, frenzied espousal of a particular party cause? Artaud’s 
own oeuvre leaves us little to go on in attempting to come to terms with these 
qualms. Instead, a further unraveling of the complex nature of Artaudian cruelty 
should yield an internally antagonistic, anti-identitarian politics in contrast with 
the conformist spectacular, ocularcentric politics dominant within and all around 
the French Third Republic. 
Where “discursive reason”—which “exhausts” and is in turn exhausted by 
Artaud—purveys a subjectivity and concomitant moral code antithetical to the 
overwhelming sense of codependence roused by the forces of “absolute gravitation,” 
cruelty, in the final analysis, “liberates” social and spectatorial bodies from “human 
individuality” and transcendentalist preoccupations by continually forcing them 
back onto an immanent plane.49 Cruelty is always in the service of what Artaud 
calls the “free exercise of thought,”50 arrived at by forcing a humble attenuation 
to affective “undersides” and consequently exploding the orthodox acculturation 
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of the faculty. Politically, Artaud’s philosophy would seem to necessitate a violent 
interruption of Europe’s imperial projects (and, more radical still, an interruption 
of anthropocentrism in general), which presume themselves untethered from any 
unifying, pan-continental (or trans-species) “gravitation.”51 That the “necessity” of 
“gravitation” remains paradoxically coextensive with a peculiar sense of release 
suggests that Artaud is advocating not an end to thinking but a different style of 
thinking, a model of thought freed from the sort of “reason” that had found its 
geopolitical counterpart in the project of empire. 
Uncompromising even in his theoretical explications, Artaud challenges us to 
escape the binaristic logic that opposes freedom to necessity.52 In thinking cruelty, 
we must vigilantly resist the disciplined inclination to separate and fashion such 
mutually exclusive terms. Founding its transformative agency on the incoherent 
“evidence of pure flesh,”53 Artaud’s “wholly magical” works must liberate thought—
like morality—from its rational structure to confront the hegemony of “discursive 
reason.” Within its liminal space-time, the Theatre of Cruelty reveals the strict limits 
on intentional efficacy and exacerbates the fundamental decentrality of the self; 
but it must also turn out a signaling subject capable of newly living the everyday, 
and this is precisely its moral act. 
Toward an ontology of violence and a violent ontology
The foundational issue for Artaud remains a question of style—that singular 
marker of critical contemporaneity.54 In cruelty—a mechanism the theatre 
(including the formally experimental avant-gardes) had hitherto left considerably 
underexplored—he finds the answer to his search for “a manner and language . . . [in] 
touch with the rude and epileptic rhythm of our time.”55 “Present demoralization” 
hinges, at least in part, on the theatre’s failure to adapt stylistically to its social and 
historical situation. The “rude and epileptic” everyday life in 1930s Europe had yet 
to meet its cultural equivalent—the double from which it cannot tell itself apart and 
which thereby ruptures its ontological stability. Rather than creating its own time 
and confronting spectacular society with a rudeness and epilepticity all its own, the 
script-bound or formally dallying French theatre functions merely as a submissive, 
compulsory beat in the “rhythm of [the] times.” Cruelty, as Artaud has it, must rid 
the theatre space of its “snobbish, precious, aesthetic mentalities” and open it to 
altogether less “mental” and more physiological modes of spectatorship. Revealing 
its space as a key site in the production of subjectivity, an ideal mechanism to 
discover new possibilities for pre- and trans-individuation, the theatre must 
reappropriate life from its current channels of control; it must realize its affective 
potential to serve as a prophylactic against the intellective tendencies of cultural 
elitism and the idolatry of the historically obsolete, textually reified masterpiece. 
Where disembodied linguistic representation perpetually parries away affect 
and deep time, Artaud’s twin deformations of culture and life seek to “touch” its 
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spectators in a way that would undermine the state of all the social, political, and 
religious discursive regimes of his day. “Masterpieces of the past,” he says, “are 
good for the past: they are not good for us. We have a right to say what has been 
said and even what has not been said in a way that belongs to us, in a way that is 
immediate and direct, corresponding to present modes of feeling, and understandable 
to everyone.”56 It remains the task of art—truly cruel art—to discover what these 
modes are and how precisely they can be reached by an expressive act no longer 
burdened by the demands of referentiality or intellective recognition.57 In contrast 
to his own affect-oriented “poetic language”—which perpetually “re-involves” 
its addressee in an equally “poetic place in reality”—Artaud derides what he calls 
“literary” expression for its fixity “in forms that no longer respond to the needs 
of the time.” Alphabetized, discrete, and spatially inscribed, “literature” remains 
indifferent to the social and spectatorial body and to those technologies of modern 
society that organize and distribute it. The quickly escalating cultural valuation 
of literacy—as the most basic indicator of human aptitude—lies at the heart of 
bourgeois “tyranny.” Artaud responds by making art itself illiterate. His aim is 
quite clear: the mise en scène, which includes the human voice and machinic noise 
as much as visible objects, must be experienced “immediately” and “directly” for 
“what [it] really [is]”58—namely, a temporal tangle of vibrations and resonances 
and colliding, heterogeneous durations. 
While critical work on Artaud has all too frequently pigeonholed him either as 
the theoretician of an impossible theatre or a metaphysician in an age that no longer 
has the conceptual space for metaphysical thought,59 Kimberly Jannarone documents 
an overwhelmingly positive critical response to Artaud’s earlier productions 
with the Alfred Jarry Theatre (1926-28), making possible a reevaluation of his 
theoretical tracts of the 1930s with an eye towards the very real possibility of their 
materializations on and off stage. We might, I believe, accordingly understand his 
praxis with the Jarry Theatre as a constitutive component of the cultural revolution 
his later Theatre of Cruelty would more explicitly define—a revolution having, in the 
end, less to do with theatre than the social relations amongst the “general public.” 
In the Jarry Theatre, Artaud would employ objets violemment vrais (literally, 
“violently real objects”)—“objects out of proportion that create gaps or lags, 
temporal disruptions”60—to attain those de- and trans-formations of spectatorial 
perception that necessarily precipitate such revolution. Jannarone explains that, 
“as elements were heightened and denatured, their function became twofold. They 
called attention to themselves as sensory stimuli, as violently real, but they also 
pulled the scene out of the realm of the ordinary, thus giving it significance in a 
‘tangential’ realm, be it symbolic or ‘magical.’”61 A decade later, in The Theater 
and Its Double, Artaud ambitiously promises to “rhythmically” entwine such 
“violently real objects” with equally “violent” manipulations of light, sound, and 
verbal utterance, each element collapsing in on itself before achieving any sort of 
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self-enclosed meaning—all mingling on a plane of immanence that delimits the 
individuation of the spectatorial body. Spectacular violence, one among many means 
of perceptive and ontological interference at the disposal of the metteur en scène, 
remains vital to Artaud’s theatre precisely for its atmospheric weight, its entirely 
unscripted (and unscriptable) permeation of characters, audience, and milieu, even, 
as Deleuze has it, before any action occurs.62 Enshrouded in an ensemble destined 
for such Cruel ends, individuals cannot but disappear in the overwhelming sensation 
of responsibility for the impulses herein released.63
Here, plagued by this unbearable responsibility forced on spectators by Artaud’s 
absolute cruelty, they finally achieve the “touching” of culture and life—the spatial 
and temporal separations that had determined their mutual alienation now breached 
by the hitherto unthought moral power of affect. The Theatre of Cruelty folds 
spectators simultaneously into both culture and life, so that they, placed too close 
to achieve traditional perspective, must enter into a mode of haptic spectatorship, 
“exceeding” and “extending beyond” and fundamentally altering vision itself—
that “noblest of human senses.”64 In the end, this leveling of the hierarchy of 
perceptive faculties must be seen as a political act through and through. Culture 
and life coincide where bodies become de-individuated and trans-individuated, 
where identities collapse into the mise en scène. The spectacular politics and 
attendant cultural entities against which Artaud writes betray their own fundamental 
inadequacy in sustaining the “life” that Cruelty seeks to expose. 
When “all the senses [begin to] interpenetrate,” as it were, the verbalized 
linguistic sign “act[s] like [a] silent blow . . . an inflammatory image thrust into 
our abruptly wakened heads.” The signifier, traditionally conceived as more or 
less transparent, here remains utterly inseparable from the rhythmic, timbral, and 
tonal qualities of its coming to presence. The leap to referential meaning loses its 
coherence in a movement of immanent (and imminent) becoming. Reiterating the 
double nature of the objets violemment vrais conjured within the Jarry Theatre’s 
mise en scène, the cruelly silent sign confronts the audience as at once fantastically 
illogical yet undoubtedly real—itself a thing to be experienced physiologically as 
a “blow” that remains dumb in the face of our intellective demands. Alongside 
“noises that are unbearably piercing,” “new ways of spreading light,” “objects 
of strange proportions,” and a wholesale “abandon[ment of] the architecture of 
present-day theater,” verbal articulations that accentuate the innate gesturo-hapticity 
of language work to undercut some of our most deeply engrained perceptual habits. 
Artaud’s is a “theater space . . . utilized not only its dimensions and volume but, 
so to speak, in its undersides”—which is to say in its utterly invisible aspects, in 
its temporal existence. Cruelty demands a radical temporalization to set ablaze the 
values and norms of a society whose subjects remain tragically ill-equipped for 
the moral task of “coinciding” with life. The “inflammatory image” to which they 
awake is, to be precise, an obscured image, an image of time. The “undersides” 
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augment indefinitely those counter-effective spatial separations circumscribing the 
traditional theatre. Temporalized from the start, Artaud’s space is never static, never 
identical to itself, a virtual space constantly vibrating, throwing itself back and 
forth through time—a strategic site for the distribution of intensities, constituted by 
affects, sensations, and vibrations rather than characters, dialogue, plot, and form. 
Grounded in topological deformation and the ever disruptive coming into being 
of what was once misconstrued as a fully constituted space, the Theatre of Cruelty 
seeks to “reforge the chain between what is and what is not,”65 between a presently 
extant bundle of sensations and all those past and future with which it resonates. 
For all its overt animosity, Artaud’s project at last proves to be an experiment 
in immanent community foundation. “The chain between what is and what is 
not” is held loosely together by a spectatorial body through which vibrations are 
relayed, multiplied, and transformed, forming an intercorporeal group subject held 
open to the aleatoric promise of things past and things to come. Here, disruptions, 
reversals, and hesitations are essential attributes of ecstatic care. This genuinely co-
individuated community is fragile, to say the least, and the antagonistic production 
of new subjectivities entails a tremendous risk, a risk that Artaud, uniquely sensitive 
to the “rude and epileptic rhythms” of interbellum France, tortuously bore in both 
art and life alike. Some seventy years later and no less spellbound by the mass 
reproduction of images in all spheres of everyday life, we discover that in Artaud, 
just as he once discovered in the superabundant impressions of the Balinese theatre, 
“IT IS WE WHO WERE SPEAKING”—impossibly—all along.66
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